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Inductive generalization with familiar
categories: developmental changes
in children’s reliance on perceptual
similarity and kind information
Karrie E. Godwin* and Anna V. Fisher
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition; however, the factors
underpinning this ability early in development remain contested. The present study
was designed to (1) test the predictions of the naïve theory and a similarity-based
account and (2) examine the mechanism by which labels promote induction. In
Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children made inferences about highly familiar categories.
The results were not fully consistent with either theoretical account. In contrast to
the predictions of the naïve theory approach, the youngest children in the study did
not ignore perceptually compelling lures in favor of category-match items; in contrast
to the predictions of the similarity-based account, no group of participants favored
perceptually compelling lures in the presence of dissimilar-looking category-match items.
In Experiment 2 we investigated the mechanisms by which labels promote induction
by examining the influence of different label types, namely category labels (e.g., the
target and category-match both labeled as bird) and descriptor labels (e.g., the target
and the perceptual lure both labeled as brown) on induction performance. In contrast
to the predictions of the naïve theory approach, descriptor labels but not category
labels affected induction in 3-year-old children. Consistent with the predictions of the
similarity-based account, descriptor labels affected the performance of children in all age
groups included in the study. The implications of these findings for the developmental
account of induction are discussed.
Keywords: categorization, induction, reasoning, children, cognitive development
Introduction
Inductive reasoning involves making generalizations from instances. It is a powerful and effective
tool for generating new knowledge. Consider this example: when told a novel fact about alligators
(e.g., “alligator embryos lack sex chromosomes”) most adults correctly conclude that crocodile
embryos also lack sex chromosomes. Thus, making an inductive inference on the basis of what
is known creates new knowledge. This mode of inference is not guaranteed to generate correct
knowledge (one might incorrectly overgeneralize a fact about alligator embryos to all oviparous
animals). Nevertheless, the ability to make such inferences is a hallmark of mature cognition.
In the absence of perceptual information to guide inferences, adults have been hypothesized to
make inferences on the basis of their knowledge about object kind: objects that belong to the same
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or related categories are likely to have many properties in
common (e.g., Rips, 1975; Osherson et al., 1990; Kemp and
Tenenbaum, 2008; Hayes et al., 2010; Murphy and Ross,
2010). In other words, adults are said to use category-based
induction to generalize from the known to the unknown. Despite
general agreement that category-based induction is a ubiquitous
component of mature cognition (although see Sloman, 1993),
there is little agreement regarding the developmental origins
of this ability. In particular, it remains unclear whether young
children utilize object kind information in the course of
induction and what role linguistic labels play in this process. In
recent years, the debate on the development of category-based
induction has been dominated by two alternative perspectives: a
naïve theory account (Gelman and Markman, 1986; Markman,
1990) and a similarity-based account (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004,
2012). Two fundamental differences between these accounts
are: (1) whether category-based induction emerges gradually in
the course of development or whether children are initially
predisposed to rely on object kind information in the course
of induction and (2) whether linguistic labels contribute to
inductive inference by providing information about object kind
or by increasing featural overlap among presented entities. Below
we provide a brief overview of each account, focusing on these
two major distinctions.
According to the naïve theory approach, from very early
in development people first identify the category membership
of items under consideration and then generalize a known
property to items of the same kind: “by 2 ½years, children
expect categories to promote rich inductive inferences. . . and they
can overlook conflicting perceptual appearances in doing so”
(Gelman and Coley, 1990, p. 802). Furthermore, it has been
suggested that the ability to make category-based inferences is
not a product of development and learning. Instead, children are
“initially biased” to recognize that labels denote categories and
make inferences on the basis of shared labels and hence shared
category membership (Gelman and Markman, 1986, p. 207), an
idea that has been highly influential in the literature (e.g., Keil,
1989; Gelman andColey, 1990; Booth andWaxman, 2002; Kalish,
2006; Jaswal and Markman, 2007). Thus, under the naïve theory
account, from a very early age children are expected to make
category-based inductions even if perceptual information is in
conflict with category membership information. As a result, one
would expect even young children to perform relatively well on
simple induction tasks when category membership information
is readily available. Additionally, any observed improvement
in performance with age is thought to be due to a reduction
in statistical noise rather than changes in the mechanisms of
induction.
In contrast to the naïve theory approach, Sloutsky and Fisher
(2004) proposed a similarity-based account called SINC (for
Similarity, Induction, Naming, and Categorization). According
to SINC, children make inferences on the basis of the overall
similarity of presented entities computed over all perceived
object features. Within this approach, labels are considered to
be object features (rather than category markers) that contribute
to the overall perceived similarity. Therefore, according to
SINC an inference can be label-based without necessarily
being category-based. Several findings suggest that children
rely primarily on overall perceptual similarity of objects (but
not category membership information) to make inferences well
beyond the preschool years, possibly until 7–9 years of age
(e.g., Fisher and Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky et al., 2007; Badger
and Shapiro, 2012; Sloutsky and Fisher, 2012). In other words,
in contrast to the early competence notion advocated by the
proponents of the naïve theory account, proponents of SINC
suggest that category-based induction is not a developmental
default, but instead category-based induction follows a protracted
developmental course.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for the naïve theory account
comes from the seminal study by Gelman and Markman (1986).
In this study researchers asked preschool-age children and
college students to make inferences about natural kind objects
when perceptual information was ambiguous or conflicted with
category membership (cf. Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004). Labels
were used to communicate category information; for instance,
participants were asked whether a target item (e.g., a brown
squirrel) shared a non-obvious property with the test item that
was designed to look similar to the target (e.g., a brown rabbit)
or with the test item that was designed to look dissimilar from
the target but belonged to the same category (e.g., a gray squirrel;
but see Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004 for divergent arguments and
data about the calibration of perceptual similarity in this study).
The overall rate of category-match choices was above chance,
both in preschool children and college students. These findings
were taken as evidence that even young children hold a belief
(or a naïve theory) that natural kind objects share a number of
unobservable properties if they belong to the same category, and
make inductive inferences on the basis of this belief. Subsequent
studies reported similar findings in younger children and even
infants (e.g., Gelman and Coley, 1990; Graham et al., 2004).
The similarity-based approach explains these findings through
the contribution of the similarity of auditory features (i.e.,
linguistic labels in this case) to inductive inference. A
mathematical model based on the SINC framework successfully
captured the pattern of findings reported by Gelman and
Markman (1986). Specifically, when visual features of the stimuli
were ambiguous (e.g., the target matched one of the test objects
on the shape dimension and the other test object on the texture
and color dimensions; for details see Fisher, 2007), identical
auditory features (such as linguistic labels) dramatically increased
the perceptual similarity between pairs of objects (Sloutsky and
Fisher, 2004, 2012). Thus, the same set of findings was interpreted
in very different ways by the competing theoretical frameworks.
There has been considerable empirical support for both the
naïve theory account (Gelman and Markman, 1986; Gelman
and Coley, 1990; Gelman, 2003; Gelman and Davidson, 2013)
and SINC (Sloutsky and Lo, 1999; Sloutsky and Fisher,
2004, 2012; Fisher and Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky et al., 2007;
Badger and Shapiro, 2012). Nevertheless, the central claims of
each account remain contested. Specifically, it is unclear (1)
whether category-based induction is indeed a developmental
default, and (2) whether linguistic labels promote inductive
generalization by pointing to common categories or by increasing
perceived similarity between objects denoted by identical (or
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phonologically similar) labels. The present research was designed
to provide evidence related to both of these highly contested
claims.
In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-old children completed an
induction task with triads of objects in which visual similarity
was in conflict with category membership, akin to the tasks used
in much of the prior research (e.g., Gelman and Markman, 1986;
Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004; Badger and Shapiro, 2012). However,
because identical linguistic labels introduce the problem of
interpretation, in Experiment 1 we did not use labels to
communicate category membership. Instead, we selected items
that are highly familiar to young children and whose category
membership can be readily identified by young children without
labels being provided by an experimenter. In other words, in
contrast to the Gelman and Markman (1986) study, we did not
use perceptually ambiguous items that required linguistic labels
to disambiguate category membership. Using highly detailed
and readily identifiable images removes the possibility that
children may make inferences that are label-based but not
category-based. The extant accounts make divergent predictions
regarding children’s performance patterns in this task: According
to the naïve theory approach, children should make category-
based inferences at above chance level even in the absence of
linguistic labels, because labels are simply one way to point
to object kind information (e.g., Gelman and Davidson, 2013).
In contrast, SINC predicts that young children should make
inferences on the basis of perceptual similarity, although it’s
possible that category-based inference may emerge in the course
of development.
In Experiment 2, we asked children to make inductive
inferences using the same triads as in Experiment 1, however
in contrast to Experiment 1, each object was denoted by a
linguistic label. In order to examine whether labels contribute
to induction by pointing to object kind information or by
increasing perceived similarity of presented entities, we used
two different types of labels: Category Labels and Descriptor
Labels. In the Category Labels condition, linguistic labels denoted
object kind (e.g., bird, clock, etc.); but in the Descriptor Labels
condition, linguistic labels described a salient property of the
stimulus but did not provide information about object kind (e.g.,
brown, round, etc.). If labels promote inductive inference by
pointing to categories, children should be likely to make label-
based inferences in the Category Labels condition but not in the
Descriptor Labels condition. However, if early in development
labels promote induction by increasing perceived similarity
among compared entities, children should make label-based
inferences in both the Category Labels and the Descriptor Labels
condition.
Finally, in both Experiments reported in this paper we asked
children to make inductive inferences about animals as well as
artifacts. The naïve theory approach suggests that natural kinds
should promote inductive inferences to a greater degree than
artifacts across all age groups tested in the reported studies
(e.g., Gelman and Markman, 1986, p. 185; Gelman, 2003). In
contrast, SINC makes no such prediction and suggests instead
that inferences should be similarity-based for both types of
items.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Participants were 57 children: 18 five-year-olds (Mage = 5.46
years, SD = 0.34 years, 9 females, 9 males), 21 four-year-
olds (Mage = 4.44 years, SD = 0.26 years, 10 females, 11
males), and 18 three-year-olds (Mage = 3.66 years, SD =
0.27 years, 10 females, 8 males). Participants were recruited
from local schools, preschools, and the Phipps Conservatory
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Children were tested individually
by trained research assistants. This experiment was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the Carnegie
Mellon University Institutional Review Board. Parental consent
was obtained and the children provided verbal assent prior to
participating in the study.
Design and Procedure
Visual stimuli
The visual stimuli included 14 triads displayed on a computer
screen: 7 triads depicted artifacts and the remaining 7 triads
depicted animals (see Figure 1). The stimuli were color
photographs or detailed color pictures of objects. All triads
consisted of a target item, category-match, and a perceptual-
match. The triads were designed such that category membership
was in conflict with perceptual similarity. Specifically, perceptual-
match items matched the target item in both shape and color, and
category-match items were selected such that they did not match
the target item in either shape or color. Item selection was based
on the Familiarity Calibration (described below), which ensured
that children of this age group could readily identify the category
membership of the items using common basic level labels.
Familiarity calibration
A separate group of preschool children (N = 13, Mage =
4.61 years, SD = 0.20) participated in the calibration. The
calibration consisted of a basic naming task: Participants were
presented with a series of pictures displayed individually on a
computer screen and asked to identify the object in the picture. If
a child provided a subordinate level label, the experimenter was
instructed to administer a prompt. For example, if children called
the bird a “parrot” the experimenter would ask the child, “What
kind of animal is a parrot?” If a child provided a semantically-
similar label, the experimenter was instructed to administer a
prompt. For example, if children called the monkey a “gorilla”
the experimenter would ask the child what else the item might be
called. If on any trial a child reported that they did not know the
name of the test item, the experimenter was instructed to prompt
the child to take their best guess.
Scoring of the calibration data was based on the following
criteria: For perceptual-match items a correct response was
classified as a response in which children provided the desired
label or a label that was semantically-similar to the desired
label (e.g., necklace-beads). Alternative labels were accepted as
correct responses since the same pattern of category-based
induction should be observed regardless of whether children use
the intended label or an alternative label (i.e., children should
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FIGURE 1 | Visual stimuli used in the Property Induction Task. No
labels were presented during the task. Each triad included a target, a
category-match test item, and a perceptual-match test item. During
the experiment, the target items were presented in the middle of the
screen above the test items and approximately equidistant from each
test item.
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make an inference from a bunny to another bunny regardless of
whether they call the perceptual-match a squirrel or a chipmunk).
A more stringent naming criteria was used for the target and
category-match items compared to the perceptual-match items
in order to ensure that children understood these items were the
same kind of thing (a prerequisite for category-based reasoning)
and thus ruling out the possibility that children are failing to
engage in category-based reasoning due to lack of familiarity with
the items. For target items and category-match items, a correct
response was recorded if children provided the basic-level label.
Correct responses also included occasions in which a child said
an object name that included the basic-level label as part of his
or her response (e.g., “polar-bear” for “bear,” or “chocolate cake”
for “cake”). Subordinate labels or semantically-similar labels were
accepted as correct responses only if children used the same label
for both the target and the category-match (e.g., for the bird
trials a child would receive credit if he or she labeled both the
target and category-match as “parrot” because the same pattern of
category-based induction should be observed since in both cases
the child is identifying both items as the same kind of thing).
See Table 1 for alternate labels that were accepted as correct
responses for each trial.
TABLE 1 | Accuracy data for the Familiarity Calibration and examples of alternate labels scored as correct for each trial based on the aforementioned
scoring criteria.
Test item Proportion correct Alternate labels Test item Proportion correct Alternate labels
Bunny Target 1.00 Bunny-Rabbit Book Target 1.00
Category 1.00 Rabbit Category 1.00
Squirrel Perceptual 0.92 Chipmunk* Present Perceptual 1.00 Gift
Bird Target 0.69 Clock Target 1.00
Category 0.77 Category 0.92
Bat Perceptual 1.00 Plate Perceptual 0.77 Dish
Bowl
Cat Target 1.00 Kitty Light Target 0.92 Lights
Category 1.00 Kitten Category 1.00 Light bulb
Kitty-cat Christmas lights
Raccoon Perceptual 0.85 Necklace Perceptual 1.00 Jewelry
Beads
Bracelet
Pig Target 1.00 Piggy Cake Target 1.00 Birthday cake
Category 0.92 Piglet Category 0.92 Cupcake
Chocolate cake
Dog Perceptual 0.92 Doggie Drum Perceptual 1.00
Puppy
Puppy-Dog
Bear Target 1.00 Polar-bear Balloon Target 1.00
Category 0.92 Teddy bear Category 1.00
Gorilla Perceptual 0.85 Monkey Lollipop Perceptual 0.92 Sucker
Chimpanzee Candy
Ape
Monkey Target 0.92 Umbrella Target 0.85
Category 0.54 Category 1.00
Cat Perceptual 0.92 Kitty Candy cane Perceptual 0.92 Candy
Kitten Sucker
Kitty-cat
Dog Target 1.00 Doggie Flashlight Target 1.00 Light
Category 1.00 Puppy Category 0.92 Torch
Puppy-Dog
Cow Perceptual 1.00 Bull Microphone Perceptual 0.85
*Although “chipmunk” was counted as a correct response, this response was not very common. Only 2 of the 13 (15%) children who participated in the Familiarity Calibration produced
the label “chipmunk” for “squirrel.”
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Mean accuracy for labeling the objects was high (M =
0.93, SD = 0.04). Children’s high accuracy on the calibration
suggests that the stimuli chosen for this study were highly
familiar to preschool-age children, to the point that children
could identify the objects correctly without an experimenter
supplying category labels; see Table 1 for accuracy rates on
individual test trials. Analysis of children’s errors indicated that
incorrect responses frequently occurred for trials in which the
child generated an accurate subordinate level label but was
unable to spontaneously generate the label at the basic category
level. For example, children’s accuracy on the bird category-
match was 77%. However, of the 3 children who did not receive
credit for this item, 2 of the 3 children provided an accurate
level subordinate level label (e.g., “parrot”) while the remaining
child indicated that they did not know the answer. Thus, the
accuracy data presented here are a conservative estimate of
children’s familiarity with the test items and are more likely
to underestimate than to overestimate children’s knowledge.
A Naming Task (described below), identical to the familiarity
calibration, was administered after the experiment proper. The
Naming Task served to ensure that children who participated in
the study were familiar with the stimuli.
Property induction task
In the Property Induction Task children were presented
with 14 triads. Each triad included a target, category-match,
and perceptual-match (see Figure 1). The category-match and
perceptual-match items were presented below the target item and
approximately equidistant from the target. Categorymembership
was communicated solely through detailed color photographs
and no labels were used (cf. Smith andHeise, 1992). On every trial
children were told that the target object had a particular property.
All properties were one-syllable blank predicates chosen from
the NOUN database (e.g., fisp, wilp, etc.; Horst, 2009). Then, the
children were asked to generalize the target property to one of the
test items (i.e., the category-match or the perceptual-match).
For the animal triads, children were told that the target item
possessed an internal pseudo-biological property (e.g., “This one
has fisp cells inside”) and asked to generalize the property to one
of the test items. For the artifact triads, children were told what
the target object was made of (e.g., “This one is made of fupp”)
and asked to generalize the property to one of the test items.
The screen location of the test items was counterbalanced and
the trials were presented in one of two orders: In Order 1 the
trials were randomized; for Order 2 the presentation order was
the reverse of Order 1. The presentation order (1 vs. 2) was
counterbalanced across participants.
Naming task
After the Property Induction Task, all participants completed a
Naming Task to ensure that participants were familiar with the
stimuli. The Naming Task was identical to the procedure utilized
in the Familiarity Calibration: Participants were presented with
a series of 42 pictures displayed individually on a computer
screen. Children were asked to identify the object in the picture.
Two presentation orders were created. In Order 1 the items
were pseudo randomized with the following constraints: for any
given triad, the target, category-match, and perceptual-match
could not occur on successive trials. For Order 2 the items were
administered in reverse order. The presentation order (1 vs. 2)
was counterbalanced across participants.
Results
The mean proportion of participants’ choices of category-match
items by age group and trial type are displayed in Table 2.
Children’s induction scores were submitted to a mixed ANOVA
with age (5-, 4-, and 3-year-olds) as the between-subject factor
and trial type (Animals, Artifacts) as the within-subject factor.
The effect of trial type was not significant, F(1, 54) = 0.84, p =
0.36. The interaction between trial type and age was also not
significant, F(2, 54) = 0.49, p = 0.62.
A significant effect of age was found, F(2, 54) = 14.68, p <
0.0001, partial η2 = 0.35. Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated the
following pattern of findings in children’s proportion of category-
match choices: 5-year-old children > 4-year-old children > 3-
year-old children, all ps < 0.05. The effect size for the difference
in induction performance between the 5-year-olds and the
preschool children was large (5-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds Cohen’s
d = 1.0; 5-year-olds vs. 3-year-olds Cohen’s d = 2.00), as was the
effect size for the difference between 4- and 3-year-olds (Cohen’s
d = 0.80). Additionally, 4- and 5-year-old children selected
category-match items at above chance (0.50) level, both one-
sample ts ≥ 2.32, p < 0.05. However, the performance of 3-year-
old children did not differ from chance, one-sample t(17) = 1.10,
p = 0.29 (see Figure 2).
TABLE 2 | Mean proportions of choices of category-match items (SD) by
age group and trial type.
Age Group Animals Artifacts
5-Year-Olds 0.81 (0.22) 0.80 (0.22)
4-Year-Olds 0.61 (0.25) 0.61 (0.26)
3-Year-Olds 0.49 (0.24) 0.41 (0.21)
FIGURE 2 | Summary of children’s performance on the Property
Induction Task and the Naming Task across age groups. Error bars
represent the standard errors of the mean.
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Preschool children’s difficulty on the Property Induction Task
was clearly not due to lack of familiarity with the stimuli as
evidenced by children’s ability to label the stimuli with high
accuracy (see Figure 2). Performance on the Naming Task1
was high across all three age groups (M3−year−olds = 0.87,
SD = 0.10; M4−year−olds = 0.90, SD = 0.17; M5−year−olds =
0.94, SD = 0.07). Although 5-year-olds exhibited superior
performance on the Naming task compared to 3-year-olds
[t(34) = −2.49, p = 0.018], there was no significant difference
in 3- and 4-year-olds’ Naming Task performance [t(36) = −
0.558, p = 0.581 ns]. Critically, there was no significant
difference in the naming accuracy between 5- and 4-year-
olds, independent-samples t(36) = 1.10, p = 0.28, despite
dramatic differences in their induction performance. A test
of equivalence was also conducted using Weber and Popova’s
(2012) Independent-Samples Equivalence Procedure in order
to ascertain whether naming performance in 5-year-olds and
4-year-olds was statistically equivalent. Theminimum substantial
effect (1 = 0.5) was selected based on Cohen’s (1988) guidelines
for a medium effect. The equivalence test was marginally
significant suggesting that naming performance was comparable
across these two age groups; t(36) = 1.10, p = 0.057. For mean
triad level data see Supplementary Material Table 1.
Although children exhibited high levels of accuracy on
the Naming Task, children misidentified some of the test
items. This leaves open the possibility that differences in
induction performance stem from differences in children’s level
of familiarity with the stimuli. However, this possibility seems
unlikely given the conservative scoring approach utilized in
the Naming Task discussed above. Furthermore, the correlation
between children’s induction performance and accuracy on
the Naming Task was not statistically significant in preschool
children (in 3- and 4-year-olds both rs ≤ 0.18, both ps ≥
0.49) or in older children (r = 0.39, p = 0.11 in 5-year-
old children). Nevertheless, to fully evaluate the possibility that
misidentification of items on the Naming Task contributed to
children’s induction performance, we reanalyzed the induction
data correcting for performance on the Naming Task. Being
able to accurately identify the target and category-match is a
critical prerequisite for children to engage in category-based
induction. Thus, we retained induction scores only for triads
in which the mean accuracy on the Naming Task for the
target and category-match were 89% or above. The Naming
Task requires children to produce a label for each pictured
item. Consequently, the task is more difficult than recognition
tasks (e.g., the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, Dunn and
Dunn, 2007) in which children simply point to a target item
labeled by the experimenter. Therefore, we deemed that 89%
accuracy on the Naming Task demonstrates sufficiently high
level of familiarity with the items by most children to support
spontaneous category-based inductive inferences. As a result
of the correction, three induction triads were removed from
the analysis: bird-bird-bat, monkey-monkey-cat, and light-light-
necklace. After correcting for accuracy on the Naming Task,
1One child did not provide a verbal response and thus did not contribute any
Naming task data.
the rate of choices of category-match items was 46% in 3-year-
old children (compared with the uncorrected mean of 45%),
61.47% in 4-year-olds (compared with the uncorrected mean of
61%), and 81.31% in 5-year-olds (compared with the uncorrected
mean of 81%). Children’s corrected induction scores were again
submitted to a mixed ANOVA with age (5-, 4-, and 3-year-olds)
as the between-subject factor and trial type (Animals, Artifacts)
as the within-subject factor. The effect of trial type was not
significant, F(1, 54) = 0.021, p = 0.887. The interaction between
trial type and age was also not significant, F(2, 54) = 1.068,
p = 0.351. A significant effect of age was found, F(2, 54) =
12.273, p < 0.0001, partial η2 = 0.31. Post-hoc Tukey
tests indicated the following pattern of findings in children’s
proportion of category-match choices: 5-year-old children made
significantly more category-match choices than both 4-year-olds
and 3-year-olds (both ps < 0.05), 4-year-old children also made
more category-match choices than 3-year-old children but this
difference was only marginally significant, p = 0.09. Therefore,
children’s pattern of induction performance remained largely
unchanged after correcting for misidentifications on the Naming
Task.
The results of Experiment 1 are not fully consistent with
either the naïve theory approach or SINC. Specifically, the naïve
theory approach predicts above chance selection of category-
match items by 2 ½years of age (Gelman and Coley, 1990),
particularly for natural kind items. In contrast to this prediction,
we observed a gradual age-related increase in the proportion
of category-match choices, such that performance of 4- and
5-year-old children, but not of 3-year-old children, was above
chance. Also in contrast to the predictions of the naïve theory
approach there was no effect of item type (i.e., animals vs.
artifacts) on performance. However, the observed pattern of
results was also not fully consistent with the predictions of
SINC (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004). SINC predicts a developmental
increase in children’s ability to make inferences to category-
match items, which was observed in Experiment 1. However,
SINC also predicts that early in development children’s inferences
should be based predominantly on perceptual similarity; yet, not
even the youngest participants in Experiment 1 were likely to
make perceptual-match choices over category-match choices. In
the General Discussion section we return to these findings and
consider them in the context of other related findings in the
literature.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we examined the mechanisms by which
labels promote induction by investigating the influence of
different label types (category and descriptor labels) on induction
performance. Identical category labels are inherently confounded
as they point to category information while providing an
additional feature match between the labeled items. Furthermore,
it has been suggested that early in life the attentional weight
of auditory features is greater than that of visual features
(e.g., Sloutsky and Napolitano, 2003; Robinson and Sloutsky,
2013); consequently, labels might make a particularly strong
contribution to induction not by denoting object kind but by
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increasing perceived similarity of the labeled items (Sloutsky and
Fisher, 2004, 2012). However, descriptor labels (i.e., labels that
describe a perceptual characteristic of the item that is orthogonal
to its category membership) only provide perceptual information
and cannot be construed as a category marker. Therefore, in
Experiment 2 we provided children with identical labels for the
target and one of the test items (i.e., the category-match or
perceptual-match) based on condition: In the Category Label
condition we provided identical labels for the target and category-
match (e.g., bird), and in the Descriptor Labels condition we
provided identical labels for the target and the perceptual-match
(e.g., brown).
By comparing children’s induction performance with category
and descriptor labels to a no-label baseline we can examine the
mechanism by which labels promote induction. If labels promote
induction by communicating object kind, the proportion of
category-match choices should be above the No-Label Baseline in
the Category Labels condition, but it should remain unchanged
in the Descriptor Labels condition. If instead labels promote
induction by increasing perceived similarity between the labeled
entities, the proportion of category-match choices should be
above the No-Label Baseline in the Category Labels condition
and below the No-Label Baseline in the Descriptor Labels
condition. In other words, both theoretical approaches make
similar predictions for performance in the Category Labels
condition; however, only SINC predicts that category labels and
descriptor labels should affect children’s induction performance.
Methods
Participants
In this study, 160 children participated. Participants included: 5-
year-olds (N = 53, Mage = 5.24 years, SD = 0.24, 25 Males,
28 Females); 4-year-olds N = 54, Mage = 4.53, SD = 0.23,
31 Males, 23 Females); and 3-year-olds (N = 53, Mage = 3.65,
SD = 0.22, 23 Males, 30 Females). Participants were recruited
from local schools, preschools, and the Phipps Conservatory
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Children were tested individually
by trained research assistants. None of the children from
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. This experiment
was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the
Carnegie Mellon University Institutional Review Board. Parental
consent was obtained and the children provided verbal assent
prior to participating in the study.
Design and Procedure
Visual stimuli
Visual stimuli were identical to those used in the Property
Induction Task in Experiment 1. The visual stimuli included
14 triads displayed on a computer screen: 7 triads referred to
artifacts and 7 triads referred to animals.
Property induction task
The basic structure of the Property Induction Task was identical
to Experiment 1: Children were presented with 14 triads; each
triad included a target, a category-match, and a perceptual-
match item (see Figure 1). However, in contrast to Experiment
1 in which no labels were used, in Experiment 2 children
were assigned to one of three labeling conditions: No-Label
Baseline, Category Labels, and Descriptor Labels). Thus, the label
condition was a between-subjects factor.
On each trial, children were told that the target object had
a particular property. All properties were one-syllable blank
predicates chosen from the NOUN database (e.g., fisp, wilp,
etc.; Horst, 2009). Twenty-eight blank predicates were selected:
14 blank predicates were randomly assigned to the No Label
Condition and the remaining 14 were assigned to the Category
Label and Descriptor Label conditions. The children were asked
to generalize the target property to one of the test items (i.e.,
the category-match or the perceptual-match). In the No Label
Condition the procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Children
were told that the target object had a particular property (e.g.,
“This one has lorp cells inside”) and asked to generalize the
property to either the category-match or the perceptual-match
(e.g., “Which of these [category/perceptual matches] do you
think has lorp cells inside like this one [target]—this one or this
one? [category/perceptual matches]”). In the Category Labels
Condition, the procedure was identical except children were
told the basic level label for each item (e.g., The dog has zerb
cells inside. Which of these [category/perceptual matches] do
you think has zerb cells inside like this dog [target]—the dog
or the cow? [category/perceptual matches]”). Similarly, in the
Descriptor Labels Condition children were given a label that
described a physical attribute of the object such as its color
or shape (e.g., The spotted one has zerb cells inside. Which of
these [category/perceptual matches] do you think has zerb cells
inside like this spotted one [target]—the brown one or the spotted
one? [category/perceptual matches]”). A full list of the linguistic
stimuli utilized in the experiment is provided in Table 3. The
screen location of the test items was counterbalanced and the
trials were presented in one of two orders: In Order 1 the trials
were randomized. For Order 2 the presentation order was simply
reversed. Presentation order (1 vs. 2) was counterbalanced across
participants.
Naming task
After the experiment proper, participants completed the Naming
Task. The procedure for the Naming Task was identical to that
in Experiment 1. Due to policy restrictions regarding how long
children could be absent from their classroom, some children
completed the Naming Task in a separate testing session. The
average delay between the Induction Task and the Naming Task
was 0.44 days (SD = 1.46 days, range: 0–8 days). The Naming
Task served to ensure that the children in Experiment 2 were
familiar with all of the stimuli.
Results
Mean induction scores by age group, trial type, and condition are
displayed in Table 4. Children’s induction scores were submitted
to a mixed ANOVA with age (3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and label
condition (No Labels, Category Labels, and Descriptor Labels) as
the between-subject factors and trial type (Animals, Artifacts) as
the within-subject factor. The results indicated a significant effect
of label condition [F(2, 151) = 40.53, p =< 0.0001, partial η
2
=
0.35] and a marginally significant effect of age [F(2, 151) = 2.41,
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TABLE 4 | Mean proportions of participants’ choices of category-match
items (SD) by age group, trial type, and label condition.
Age group Condition Animals Artifacts
5-Year-Olds Descriptor labels 0.45 (0.32) 0.31 (0.27)
Category labels 0.81 (0.19) 0.77 (0.20)
No Labels (Baseline) 0.72 (0.29) 0.60 (0.26)
4-Year-Olds Descriptor labels 0.31 (0.27) 0.33 (0.23)
Category labels 0.85 (0.17) 0.75 (0.26)
No Labels (Baseline) 0.56 (0.26) 0.54 (0.23)
3-Year-Olds Descriptor labels 0.41 (0.20) 0.32 (0.24)
Category labels 0.60 (0.30) 0.60 (0.36)
No Labels (Baseline) 0.60 (0.23) 0.59 (0.20)
p = 0.09, partial η2 = 0.03]; the interaction between age and
label condition was not significant, [F(4, 151) = 1.93, p = 0.109,
partial η2 = 0.05]. In contrast to Experiment 1, the effect of
trial type was significant, F(1, 151) = 7.81, p = 0.006, partial
η
2
= 0.05 with children obtaining on average higher induction
scores for animals (M = 0.59, SD = 0.30) than for artifacts
(M = 0.53, SD = 0.30). The interaction between trial type and
age was not significant [F(2, 151) = 1.11, p = 0.33]; nor was there
a significant interaction between trial type and label condition
[F(2, 151) = 0.10, p = 0.90]. One the one hand, the effect of
trial type in Experiment 2 is consistent with the predictions of
the naïve theory approach and inconsistent with the predictions
of SINC. On the other hand, this effect is somewhat difficult to
interpret given the data shown in Table 4. For example, 3-year-
olds made numerically more category-match choices for animal
than for artifact trials only in the Descriptor Labels condition and
in 4-year-old’s this pattern was seen only in the Category Labels
condition. In contrast, for 5-year-old’s this pattern emerged in
all labeling conditions. However these numerical differences in
induction performance between animal and artifact triads were
not consistently statistically significant: In 5-year-olds, there was
no statistically significant difference for the Category Labels
condition [t(17) = 1.12, p = 0.27] and a marginally significant
difference for the Descriptor Labels and No Labels conditions
[both ts ≤ 2.05, ps ≥ 0.06].
Next, in order to examine the mechanism by which labels
promote induction we compared children’s performance in each
label condition (Category Labels andDescriptor Labels) to theNo
Label Baseline Condition. For this and all subsequent analyses,
induction scores are collapsed across trial type (Animals and
Artifacts).
Category Labels vs. No Labels Baseline
The addition of category labels was not found to impact 3-
year-old children’s induction performance as there was no
significant difference in 3-year-olds’ propensity to select the
category-match in the Category Label Condition (M = 0.60)
compared to the No Label Baseline Condition (M = 0.59),
independent sample t(25.81) = 0.07, p = 0.94. A test of
statistical equivalence was also conducted using Weber and
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Popova’s (2012) Independent-Samples Equivalence Procedure in
order to ascertain whether 3-year-olds’ induction performance
in the Category label and No Label Baseline conditions were
statistically equivalent. The minimum substantial effect (1 =
0.5) was selected based on Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for a
medium effect. The equivalence test was significant suggesting
that 3-year-olds’ induction performance was comparable across
these two conditions; t(33) = 0.07, p = 0.006. In contrast,
providing category-labels did influence the performance of
older children: 4-year old children selected the category-match
items significantly more in the Category Label Condition
(0.80) compared to the No Label Baseline Condition (0.55),
independent sample t(34) = 3.57, p = 0.001. This effect was
large, Cohen’s d = 1.19. In 5-year-old children the difference
in induction performance between the Category Label (0.79) and
No Label Baseline Condition (0.66) was marginally significant,
independent sample t(34) = 1.75, p = 0.09, Cohen’s d = 0.60,
see Figure 3. Furthermore, the addition of category labels did not
support 3-year-old children’s induction performance as they did
not select the category-match above chance levels (0.50), single
sample t(17) = 1.39, p = 0.18. In contrast, when 4-year-old
children were provided with the category-label they selected the
category-match items at rates significantly above chance (0.50),
single sample t(17) = 6.35, p < 0.0001. Five-year-olds selected
category-match items above chance levels (0.50) both in the
Category Label Condition and No Label Baseline, both single
sample ts> 2.80, both ps< 0.05.
In the Category label Condition, induction performance
varied as a function of age. Older children (4- and 5-year-olds)
were more likely to select category-match items than 3-year-olds,
both independent sample ts ≥ 2.31, ps = 0.03. These effects were
large (3-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds Cohen’s d = 0.78, 3-year-olds
vs. 5-year-olds Cohen’s d = 0.77). At the same time, there was no
difference in induction performance between 4- and 5-year old
FIGURE 3 | Summary of children’s performance on the Property
Induction Task as a function of label condition (Category Label, No
Label Baseline, and Descriptor Label conditions) across age groups.
Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean. Line indicates chance
performance (0.50). *p-value < 0.05; +p-value < 0.10.
children, independent sample t(34) = 0.12, p = 0.90. Weber and
Popova’s (2012) Independent-Samples Equivalence Procedure
confirmed that 4- and 5-year-olds’ induction performance in the
Category Label Condition was comparable across these two age
groups;1 = 0.5, t(34) = 0.12, p = 0.006.
It should be noted that results of the No Labels Baseline
partially replicate the findings reported in Experiment 1.
Specifically, 5-year-old children selected category-match items
at above chance level even in the absence of category labels
[M = 0.66, single-sample t(17) = 2.81, p < 0.05], whereas 4-
year-old children’s performance was not different from chance in
the No Label Baseline [M = 0.55, single sample t(17) < 1, ns].
However, unlike Experiment 1, the performance of 3-year-old
children was above chance in the No Label Baseline [M = 0.60,
t(16) = 2.46, p < 0.05] and not significantly different from the
performance of older children (both single sample ts < 1.1, ps
> 0.488). It is unclear why performance of 3-year-old children
was different between Experiments 1 and 2 in the No Labels
Baseline condition. However, in light of 3-year-old’s chance-level
performance in the Category Labels condition of Experiment 2
[M = 0.60, t(17) = 1.39, p > 0.18] and in light of chance-level
performance of 4-year-old children in the No Labels Baseline
(both in Experiments 1 and 2), it would be premature to conclude
that young children consistently make category-based inferences.
3-year-olds’ above-chance performance in the No Labels Baseline
in Experiment 2 appears to be an anomaly to the overall pattern.
Descriptor Labels vs. No Labels Baseline
In contrast to performance in the Category Labels Condition, the
addition of descriptor labels was found to significantly impact
children’s induction performance in all three age groups: children
were significantly less likely to select the category-match in the
Descriptor Label Condition compared to the No Label Baseline
Condition (all independent sample ts ≥ 3.34, all ps ≤ 0.002),
and the effect sizes were large (3-year-olds Cohen’s d = 1.27, 4-
year-olds Cohen’s d = 1.12, 5-year-olds Cohen’s d = 1.12), see
Figure 3.
The youngest children (3- and 4-year-olds) selected category-
match items below chance levels (0.50), both single sample ts ≥
3.03, ps ≤ 0.008. Five-year-old children selected the category-
match at rates marginally below chance level, single sample
t(16) = 1.98, p < 0.065. Furthermore, there was no significant
difference in induction performance across all three age groups
(M3−year−olds = 0.36,M4−year−olds = 0.32,M5−year−olds = 0.38),
all independent sample ts ≤ 0.78, ps ≥ 0.44. Weber and Popova’s
(2012) Independent-Samples Equivalence Procedure confirmed
that induction performance in the Descriptor Label Condition
was comparable across all three age groups:1 = 0.5, all ts = 0.22
all ps = 0.036.
Similar to the results of Experiment 1, children exhibited high
levels of performance in the Naming Task2. Performance on the
Naming Task was high in all three age groups (M3−year−olds =
0.88, SD = 0.10;M4−year−olds = 0.94, SD = 0.06;M5−year−olds =
0.96, SD = 0.05) indicating that children were highly familiar
2 Due to technical difficulties, one child only completed 40 of the 42 Naming Task
trials.
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with the objects used in the present study and suggesting that
the children possessed the prerequisite knowledge to perform
category-based induction. Although children generally exhibited
a high level of accuracy on the Naming Task, 4- and 5-year-
old children obtained higher Naming Task scores than 3-year-
olds (both independent sample ts ≥ −4.18, ps < 0.0001).
There was no significant difference in the naming performance
of 4- and 5-year-olds [t(105) = −1.14, p = 0.26]. A test
of equivalence was also conducted using Weber and Popova’s
(2012) Independent-Samples Equivalence Procedure in order to
ascertain whether naming performance in 4- and 5-year-olds
was statistically equivalent. The equivalence test was significant
suggesting that naming performance was comparable across
these two age groups; 1 = 0.5, t(105) = −1.14, p < 0.0001.
For mean triad level data see Supplementary Material Table 2.
The results show that in 4- and 5-year-old children both
category and descriptor labels influence children’s induction
performance compared to the No Label Baseline, with category-
labels increasing children’s tendency to select the category-match
and descriptor labels increasing children’s tendency to select the
perceptual-match. In 4-year-old children, the effect of descriptor
and category labels on induction performance was of comparable
magnitude (i.e., Cohen’s d = 1.12 and 1.19, respectively). In 5-
year-old children, the effect size of descriptor labels was nearly
double the effect size of category labels (Cohen’s d = 1.12 and
0.60, respectively). In contrast, for 3-year-olds only descriptor
labels had a large effect on children’s performance (Cohen’s d =
1.27), whereas category labels had no effect. The observed pattern
of results is in line with predictions from SINC and conflict
with predictions from the naïve theory. Specifically, the results
suggest that a large part of the effect of labels on induction stems
from identical labels increasing the overall perceived similarity of
objects.
Discussion
The experiments presented here were designed to contrast
the predictions of the naïve theory approach (Gelman, 2003)
and SINC (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004, 2012) with regards to
two highly contentious issues: (1) whether children engage in
category-based induction overlooking conflicting appearances
from early in development, and (2) whether linguistic labels
promote induction by pointing to categories or by increasing the
overall perceived similarity of presented items. In Experiment 1
we asked 3- to 5-year-old children to make inductive inferences
about highly familiar objects (both animals and artifacts), with
detailed images obviating the need for linguistic labels to
disambiguate category membership. In other words, Experiment
1 avoided confounding category-based and label-based induction
that was problematic in some of the previous studies. Results
of Experiment 1 were partially consistent with both the naïve
theory and SINC. As predicted by SINC and in contrast to the
predictions of the naïve theory, 3-year-old children did not make
inferences to category-match items when a perceptual-match was
available, even though the categories used in the task were highly
familiar to children. Also consistent with the predictions of SINC,
there was a gradual increase between three and five years of
age in children’s tendency to make inferences to category-match
items over perceptual-match items, although the timing of this
transition was considerably accelerated compared to prior studies
which suggest that this transition does not happen until about
seven to nine years of age (Sloutsky and Spino, 2004; Badger
and Shapiro, 2012). The findings of Experiment 2 were mostly
consistent with this pattern, with the exception of 3-year-old
children making inferences to category match items at above
chance level in the absence of category labels (but interestingly,
not when category labels were provided, suggesting that this is
not a robust effect). However, in contrast to the predictions of
SINC but consistent with the predictions of the naïve theory,
children were not limited to making inferences solely on the
basis of perceptual similarity: no age group made systematic
inferences to perpetual-match items when appearances conflicted
with category membership.
Experiment 2 examined whether linguistic labels affect
children’s inductive inferences by communicating object kind (as
predicted by the naïve theory) or by increasing the perceived
similarity of the objects denoted by identical labels (as predicted
by SINC). Recall that both theoretical approaches predict that
Category Labels should affect children’s induction compared to
the No-Labels Baseline Condition; however, only SINC predicts
that Category and Descriptor Labels should affects children’s
performance. Consistent with the predictions of SINC, and
in contrast to the predictions of the naïve theory approach,
induction performance in 4- to 5-year-old children was affected
by both types of labels, such that Category Labels increased
the proportion of category-match responses and Descriptor
Labels increased the proportion of perceptual-match items
compared to the No Labels Baseline Condition. In younger
children, only the Descriptor but not Category Labels affected
children’s induction performance. Therefore, identical labels
affected younger children’s performance only when these labels
aligned with perceptual similarity but not with common category
membership, a finding that again can be explained in a
straightforward manner by SINC but is problematic for the naïve
theory.
There was an inconsistent pattern of findings with regards to
the ontological status of the objects. There were no differences in
the pattern of inferences with animals and artifacts for any of the
three age groups in Experiment 1, but in Experiment 2 children
weremore likely tomake inferences to category-match items with
animals than with artifacts. This pattern in Experiment 2 became
more robust with age: 3-year-old children showed this pattern
only in the Descriptor Labels condition, 4-year-old children only
in the Category Labels condition, and 5-year-old children in all
three label conditions (i.e., No Labels Baseline, Category Labels,
and Descriptor Labels conditions). In this regard, the findings of
Experiment 2 are consistent with the findings recently reported
by Fisher et al. (2015a, Experiment 2). In that study, children
were asked to make inductive inferences about familiar items
that were described as “hiding” behind identical doors in the
beginning of their second year in preschool (Mage = 4.33 years)
and then at the end of the school year (Mage = 4.77). In the
beginning of the school year, there were no differences in choices
of category-match items from different ontological groups (i.e.,
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animals, inanimate natural kinds, and artifacts), but at the end of
the school year children became more likely to make inferences
to category-match items for animals and inanimate natural kinds
than for artifacts. These findings, taken together with the findings
in Experiment 2 in the present study, suggest that in the course
of development, children learn that different ontological classes
support inductive inferences to a different degree, rather than
having this assumption as an early bias that is independent of
experience (cf. Gelman, 2003).
Implications for Developmental Theories of
Induction
Overall, it appears that several aspects of the reported findings
are better explained by SINC than the naïve theory. At the same
time, the lack of tendency to choose perceptual-match items
even among the youngest participants is problematic for SINC.
Additionally, SINC has trouble accounting for the findings of
prior studies in which familiar objects were described as “hiding”
behind identical doors (such that children could not rely on
the overlap in visual features to make inferences) and category
information was communicated by semantically-similar labels
(such that children could not rely on the overlap in auditory
features to make inferences) (Fisher et al., 2011; Godwin et al.,
2013; Fisher et al., 2015b; cf. Gelman and Markman, 1986).
Under these task conditions, most 4-year-old children performed
at chance level: when told about an unobservable property of
a “sheep,” they were equally likely to make an inference to a
“lamb” (category-match) and a “cow” (lure). However, over half
of 5-year-olds and nearly all 6-year-olds made inferences to the
category-match items. These findings challenge the predictions
of SINC that (1) young children make inferences solely on the
basis of perceptual similarity, and that (2) labels contribute to
induction in children solely through featural overlap.
Although the naïve theory and SINC are the two dominant
accounts of induction early in development, some researchers
have advocated the idea that domain knowledge (vs. an abstract
“initial bias” toward category-based induction) influences the
types of inductive inferences that children make. For example,
Chi et al. (1989) identified 6-year-old children who had
substantial prior knowledge about dinosaurs (i.e., dinosaur
experts) and children who possessed little knowledge about
dinosaurs. Children who were dinosaur experts tended to make
category-based inferences about dinosaurs (e.g., “he is probably
a good swimmer... cause duckbills are good swimmers”; p. 48).
In contrast, children who knew little about dinosaurs, tended
to make inferences that were based on the appearance of the
stimuli (e.g., “could walk real fast cause he has giant legs,” p.
49). Similarly, Inagaki (1990) reported that urban children who
had experience caring for a goldfish showed a distinct pattern of
inductive inferences compared to children who did not have a
pet. Additionally, these children were able to use their acquired
knowledge as a basis for reasoning about other aquatic animals.
The findings above taken together with the findings of
Experiment 1 and the findings reported in several other studies
(Fisher et al., 2011; Long et al., 2012; Godwin et al., 2013)
present a striking contrast to studies suggesting that children have
difficulty making category-based inferences until about 9 years of
age (Sloutsky and Spino, 2004; Sloutsky et al., 2007; Badger and
Shapiro, 2012). One potentially important distinction between
these two sets of studies is familiarity of the stimuli: the former
studies used real familiar categories, whereas the latter used
novel artificial categories. Thus, it appears that children do not
have an abstract “initial bias” toward category-based induction
as suggested by the naïve theory (Gelman, 2003; Gelman and
Davidson, 2013); at the same time it appears that children
base inferences primarily on perceptual features only when
objects belong to newly-learned artificial categories. Therefore,
we suggest a revised version of the similarity-based account,
which we briefly describe below.
The Perceptual and Representational Similarity
(PaRS) Account of Inductive Generalization
Fisher et al. (2015a) recently proposed a revised version of
the similarity-based account of inductive generalization. The
basic premise of this account is that one can distinguish two
forms of featural similarity: perceptual and representational
similarity. Perceptual similarity refers to features that can be
compared on-line and in-the-moment, and representational
similarity refers to the featural overlap in mental representations.
Within this proposal (to which we will refer to as PaRS—
for Perceptual and Representational Similarity), representational
similarity refers to the knowledge acquired through experience
(e.g., knowledge of what things are called, how things look, how
they may be used, etc.) rather than the knowledge that one
may have independent of experience, such as essentialist beliefs
(Gelman, 2003). According to PaRS, both types of similarity
contribute to inductive generalization, and the probability of an
inference is a function of the overall featural overlap among the
presented objects (Fisher et al., 2015b; Fisher, 2015).
Understanding the mechanisms of developmental change
in inductive reasoning with newly-learned categories remains
an important question for future research. At the same time,
PaRS (in contrast to the naïve theory and SINC) offers an
account of developmental changes in induction with familiar
categories. Specifically, PaRS suggests that developmental
changes in induction with familiar categories stem from
developmental changes in representational similarity. A number
of computational studies suggest that early in development
concepts are organized on the basis of a small number of
salient features, leading to formation of poorly differentiated
representations. However, as the number of features associated
with a concept increases, representations become progressively
more differentiated according to kind-based relations, because
objects of similar kind share a greater number of features with
each other than with objects of a different kind (Rogers and
McClelland, 2004; Hills et al., 2009; Kemp and Tenenbaum,
2008). For example, both bats and birds can fly; when little else is
known about bats and birds, their representations may be highly
similar. However, as one learns that birds—but not bats—lay
eggs, have beaks and feathers, and build nests, the representations
of birds and bats should become more distinct.
Increase in semantic differentiation on the basis of an
increase in the number of known features has been captured
by different computational models of semantic development
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(for discussion see Fisher et al., 2015b). There is also recent
empirical evidence that supports this idea (Unger et al., 2014,
under review; Fisher et al., 2015b). Furthermore, there is evidence
that individual differences in semantic differentiation of familiar
animal concepts are related to children’s ability to make category-
consistent inferences. Specifically, semantic differentiation of
familiar animal concepts was found to be positively related
to the tendency to make category-consistent inferences both
in a cross-sectional study of 4- to 7-year-old children (Fisher
et al., 2015b) as well as in a longitudinal study of 4- to 5-
year-old children (Fisher et al., 2015a). Furthermore, individual
differences in semantic differentiation of animal concepts were
a better predictor of children’s performance on the inductive
reasoning task than general intelligence: General intelligence
was related to children’s semantic differentiation, but only the
latter made a direct (unmediated) contribution to induction
performance (Fisher et al., 2015a).
Mechanisms of the Effect of Linguistic Labels on
Induction
Effect of linguistic labels on induction has been documented
in a number of studies (e.g., Gelman and Markman, 1986;
Sloutsky et al., 2001; Welder and Graham, 2001; Sloutsky and
Fisher, 2004). At the same time, the mechanism of these effects
has remained contested, with some researchers suggesting that
identical labels contribute to induction by pointing to categories
(e.g., Gelman and Markman, 1986; Gelman and Coley, 1991;
Waxman and Gelman, 2009) and other researchers suggesting
that labels are object features and contribute to induction by
increasing overall perceived similarity of objects (Sloutsky and
Fisher, 2004, 2012; Sloutsky, 2009; Deng and Sloutsky, 2012).
In the Category Labels Condition of Experiment 2, labels
could contribute to induction both through increasing overall
perceptual similarity and through communicating category
membership; however, in the Descriptor Labels Condition,
labels could not possibly communicate category membership
and could only contribute to induction by increasing overall
perceived similarity. In both 4- and 5-year-old children, both
descriptor labels and category labels had a comparable effect
on induction. This suggests that a large part of the effect
of labels on induction stems from identical labels increasing
the overall perceived similarity of objects, rather than from
labels communicating category membership. Interestingly, in 3-
year-old children only descriptor labels but not category labels
promoted inductive inferences. In other words, in the youngest
children in this study, linguistic labels promoted induction only
when they aligned with visual similarity but not with category
membership, again suggesting that perceptual information
plays a particularly important role in induction early in
development.
Overall, the findings of Experiment 2 clearly support the
predictions of SINC and pose a challenge for the naive
theory approach. However, as discussed above, starting at
approximately 5 years of age children begin to make category-
consistent inferences relying on semantically-similar labels (e.g.,
lamb-sheep) in the absence of useful visual information to
guide their induction (Fisher et al., 2011, 2015a; Godwin et al.,
2013). These findings are difficult to reconcile with SINC as
it is currently formulated (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004, 2012).
According to PaRS, labels are indeed object features (as suggested
by SINC) and can increase perceived similarity of presented
objects; however, labels are also features that can point to other
features. For example, when one sees an outline of a bird, this
visual feature can activate other features stored in memory,
such as its associated label (e.g., bird), mode of locomotion
(e.g., can fly) and so on. Similarly, when one hears a label (e.g.,
bird), this linguistic feature can activate other features stored
in memory (such as has feathers, can fly, and lays eggs). Early
in development, when few features are known and semantic
representations are therefore poorly differentiated (e.g., Hills
et al., 2009; Fisher et al., 2015b), the contribution of linguistic
labels to induction might occur primarily via increasing overall
perceived similarity of objects under consideration; however,
as semantic representations become more differentiated in the
course of development, familiar labels may begin to contribute
to induction via not only increasing perceived similarity but
also activating other object features in memory. The principal
difference between this proposal and the proposal of the naïve
theory approach is as follows: according to the naïve theory
approach linguistic labels point to categories and are distinct
from all other object features, whereas according to PaRS (as
well as SINC) linguistic labels are considered to function in a
manner similar to other object features. For example, according
to PaRS and SINC (and in contrast to the naïve theory),
category labels are not granted a special status compared to
other types of auditory features (e.g., sounds produced by
objects, such as animal sounds). Although there is considerable
evidence that linguistic labels may become category markers
by adulthood (Yamauchi and Markman, 1998, 2000; Yamauchi
et al., 2007; Yamauchi and Yu, 2008), the results of Experiment
2 provide additional evidence that labels do not start out
as such.
Broader Implications
Outside of the debate about the mechanisms of inductive
generalization early in development, the results reported here
are consistent with a broader body of research on conceptual
development. Specifically, a number of studies suggest that
detection and processing of category-level information show a
marked improvement during the preschool and early school
years. For example, in match-to-sample tasks participants are
asked to identify a test item that best matches a target item.
Typically, the target is semantically-similar to one test item,
and thematically- or perceptually-similar to a non-category-
match item (e.g., Smiley and Brown, 1979; Tversky, 1985; Deák
et al., 2002; Fisher, 2011). Children’s ability to make taxonomic
matches in the presence of perceptual lures (e.g., chocolate cake—
slice of birthday cake—brown top-hat) or thematic lures (e.g.,
carrot—rabbit—tomato) improves gradually between three and
six years of age. Similar trends emerge in free sorting tasks
in which children are asked to sort a number of items that
can be cross-classified into multiple groups (Blaye et al., 2006;
Unger et al., 2014). Specifically, 4-year-old children often produce
idiosyncratic groupings or thematic groupings, whereas by 8
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years of age children’s thematic groupings become embedded
within taxonomic groupings. Literature on the development of
analogical reasoning has similarly documented that up to 5
years of age children often focus on perceptual commonalities
when interpreting metaphors and reasoning by analogy, whereas
older children and adults tend to focus on the so-called
relational commonalities, such as shared function, causal roles,
and category membership (e.g., Gentner, 1978, 1988; Rattermann
and Gentner, 1998; Gentner and Smith, 2012).
Therefore, perceptual commonalities clearly influence
children’s performance on a broad range of cognitive tasks from
early in development, whereas the influence of category-level
information increases gradually with development and learning.
At the same time, the influence of category knowledge can
also be seen early in development under less demanding task
conditions. For example, in the absence of perceptual and
thematic lures, even 2- and 3-year-old children can select
taxonomic matches in the match-to-sample tasks (Nguyen,
2007). The present findings contribute to the large body
of research suggesting that the early grasp of taxonomic
relations is clearly tenuous and not sufficiently robust when
perceptual or thematic response options are available to
children, but shows a marked improvement over the preschool
years.
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